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Sikkim the Place and Sikkim the Documentary:
Reading Political History through the Life and After-Life
of a Visual Representation
Suchismita Das

In the year 1971, the renowned India filmmaker Satyajit Ray made a documentary on
Sikkim, commissioned by the royal family,
to showcase the small Himalayan Kingdom
which was then a protectorate of India. The
content of the film however failed to impress
its royal patrons and hence it was not publicly
released. A few years later the kingdom was
merged into India as the twenty-second state
of the union and the film was banned by the
Indian government for its sensitive topic.
After more than thirty years of unavailability
and hence a resultant unique legendary
status, the film finally became available for
unrestricted public viewing in 2011.
This paper traces the eventful trajectory of
this film, treating its journey as metaphoric of
the political history of Sikkim as it negotiated
its status within the larger nation-state
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during various configurations of political
power-structures. Reading back through the
controversies engendered in each phase,
the article sheds light on the underlying
ideological contestations over the material
and symbolic dimensions of Sikkim’s political
identity which came to bear on the course
of events. The unbounded, unpredictable
life and after-life of the film attest to the
unbounded, unpredictable ways in which
hegemonic assertions operate – such that the
meaning and significance of the film, and by
extension the meaning and significance of the
historic moment in which it was made, and the
present vantage-point remain ever-dynamic,
open to emergent re-articulations and resignifications.
Keywords: Sikkim, contested meanings, hegemony,
nationhood, sovereignty, visual representation.

Introduction

Background

In 1971, the eminent film-maker Satyajit Ray was
commissioned to make a documentary on Sikkim – titled
Sikkim1 – by its monarchy, which till then enjoyed a
semi-sovereign status as India’s protectorate. The Chos
rgyal (King) and Rgyal mo (Queen) did not give it a public
release – a fact many newspaper articles attribute to
the purported displeasure of the royalty with the film’s
depiction of Sikkim and its then rulers (Bhaumik 2010;
Telegraph 2010). Upon Sikkim’s merger with India in 1975
the film was banned, ostensibly owing to its volatile topic
(Banerjee 2010; Bhowmik 2003). This ban was finally lifted
by the Government of India in 2010, only for the film to
earn an injunction from the Court of Sikkim in the same
year after one public screening (Banerjee 2010; Chettri
2011; Paul 2010).

Sikkim is located towards the north-eastern region of
India, sandwiched between Tibet on its north and northeast, Nepal on its west and Bhutan on its east. It is a small
mountainous state with an area of 7,096 square kilometers
and a population of 611,000 according to the 2011 census.
The twenty-two ethnic communities (Balikci-Denjongpa
2011: 5) who inhabit the hills are in popular parlance often
grouped as Bhutia, Lepcha and Nepali. Kangchengdzonga,
the third highest peak in the world is located here.
Sikkim’s location thus contributes to its continued
strategic importance for India, quite disproportionate to
its small size.

In tracing in some detail the life and after-life of this film
– until its formal public release in Sikkim in 2011 – this
paper simultaneously traces the political trajectory of
the state as it transitioned from one mode of legitimate
governance to another. The conditions of this transition
remain controversial to date. The role of the Bhutia
monarchy in denying equal political representation to
its Nepali population, of the Sikkimese political parties
in destabilizing the legitimacy and popularity of the
monarchy, and of India in instigating and aggravating
local unrest to depict the inevitability of the merger –
have all been discussed as causal factors (Cooke 1980; Das
1983; Datta-Ray 1984; Rustomji 1987). Different writers
emphasize different sets of conditions. Thus the fate of
Sikkim is inextricably tied to Sikkim’s changing political
fortunes – from a peaceful Himalayan kingdom, to a
monarchy plagued by internal unrest running along
ethnic lines, to being the twenty-second state of the Indian
union with certain grievances with the center and with
certain special protections offered by the Indian central
government in its turn (Balikci 2008).
Inasmuch as these changing political conditions and
the perception of these conditions (especially among
the officialdom) determined the life of Sikkim, the film
offers a metaphoric and symptomatic reading of Sikkim’s
contemporary history. This mode of enquiry attests to
the methodological insight that the cultural, social and
political history of a place can be understood not only
through the examination of contents of particular cultural
productions about it, but also through the social life of
these cultural representations as they are produced and
circulate in the public sphere and in public imaginaries
(Appadurai 1986; Marcus 1998).

To contextualize India’s dynamics with Sikkim, which
shape the fate of Sikkim, we need to understand the
position of Sikkim in British imperial history. Sikkim, a
monarchy under a Bhutia king since 1642 (Balikci 2008:
108), first came to have substantive diplomatic ties with
the British during the Anglo-Gorkha war of 1814-1816.
The British helped Sikkim regain some its territory
which it had previously lost to Nepal, in lieu of Sikkim
providing the British an alley for communications with
Tibet and China (Lamb 1986: 34 cited in Mullard 2011:
179; Risley 1989 [1894]).2 By the middle of the nineteenth
century however Anglo-Sikkimese relations had soured
considerably. A central cause was the cultural-political
misunderstanding over the status of Darjeeling as land
granted by the Chos rgyal (pronounced Chögyal) to the
British in 1935, with both parties considering the other as
infringing on their sovereign claims to it.3 Thus allegations
and counter-allegations led to more than a decadelong conflict resulting in the attachment to portions of
Sikkimese territory by the British,4 until a new treaty was
signed in 1861 (History of Sikkim 1908, cited in Rock 1953:
932). Finally, Sikkim was made a protectorate of the empire
in 1887 when the empire thought that in its contestations
with Tibet and China over the opening up of BritishTibet trade, the Sikkimese monarch was siding with the
opposition.5 Hence a Political Officer from the Indian Civil
Services was henceforth deputed to assist the Chos rgyal,
even as over much of the nineteenth century Sikkim had
already operated under a limited sovereign status.
Thus at the moment of de-colonization of the subcontinent, Sikkim found itself in a unique position in the
geo-political scenario of the region. At this moment Sir
Tashi Namgyal transitioned from being the Chos rgyal of
a scenic Himalayan kingdom under British protectorate
status to being a Chos rgyal under the protectorate control
of independent India. His son Palden Thondup Namgyal
served as his Internal Affairs advisor, heading negotiations
HIMALAYA Volume 33, Numbers 1 & 2 | 43

with India during this transition. On his father’s death in
1965, he inherited the throne. As per the 1950 Indo-Sikkim
treaty, being the Chos rgyal of Sikkim circa 1965 entailed
that matters of communication, foreign affairs and defense
remained under the jurisdiction of India, which also
retained the right to intervene in internal administration
should law and order be threatened (Datta-Ray 1984; Hiltz
2003: 70; Rustomji 1987).
Nonetheless this was an interesting time for Sikkim. Hiltz
(2003) depicts this period as one where the Chos rgyal was
riding the “last-wave of nationalism,” 6 working on political
and cultural-symbolic registers to represent and thus
create a national identity for Sikkim. In political terms
this included the public rhetoric of renegotiation of the
treaty with India – towards greater sovereignty, a call
for Sikkim’s inclusion in the UN and its recognition as an
independent nation, demand for reduced presence of India
in Sikkim’s administrative structure and the transfer of
exercise duties on goods imported into Sikkim that were
being retained by India. Culturally and symbolically this
effort rested on greater visibility of distinct Sikkimese
insignia like the flag, national anthem, handicraft products
and an effort to engender, especially through education, a
national consciousness (Cooke 1980; Das 1983; Hiltz 2003;
Rose 1969).
After the death of his first wife,7 the Chos rgyal married
Hope Cooke, an American whom he met on the latter’s visit
to Darjeeling (Cooke 1980; Rustomji 1987). She played a big
part in the cultural-symbolic efforts to increase Sikkim’s
visibility on the world map. Hiltz (2003: 81) highlights an
iconic moment capturing this phase when Indira Gandhi,
the Prime Minister of India visited Sikkim in 1968, and
“nine hundred alternately spaced flags of India and Sikkim
lined the route of her motorcade” with the King publicly
speaking of Sikkim’s aspirations for UN recognition.
Hiltz argues that this assertion was rooted in a distinct
Tibeto-Burman identity which, through a narrative of
common non-Aryan descent, sought to over-ride the
cultural differences between the Bhutia-Lepcha population
who were considered the original inhabitants of the
state and the more recently migrated Nepali population.
However, such a narrative of a distinctive Sikkimese
identity in contrast with India, rooted in an ostensibly
ethnic commonality, was still exclusionary in its ability to
encompass only those Nepali origin immigrants who were
of the non-Aryan stock. 8
The Chos rgyal’s second marriage substantially contributed
to Sikkim’s visibility in the international media. As Hope
Cooke became “the first American-born queen in history” 9
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by her “clear choice of a destiny linked to a remote
Himalayan Kingdom” (Vogue 1963: 143), the kingdom
was served up to the American imagination via news and
lifestyle magazines. On one hand, Sikkim was represented
as the exotic other where “frolicking pandas and prowling
snow leopards” roamed an “an enclave of rain forests and
staggering mountains”, and the “Maharajah personally
own[ed] Kanchenjunga” (Time 1963b; Vogue 1963: 143).
At the same time, Sikkim was also suddenly accessible
through the mediating presence of one of the West’s own,
which allowed for the realization that Sikkim’s palace
looked “surprisingly like a summer house in Maine”
(Vogue 1963: 143). Thus international magazines covered
the “$60,000 Buddhist rite” of the royal wedding in the
“doll-house capital of Gangtok” where “snow lions and
billions of other Sikkimese deities” were invoked to bless
the union, in the presence of a “top-hatted” west which
encountered a “yak-skin booted” east (Time 1963a).
On the eve of Palden Thondup’s ascendency to the throne,
magazines reported on this reincarnated king who was
“more interested in agriculture and atomic energy…
than in the miraculous”. His statement that “steadfastly
we shall reach our goal of freedom from want, disease
and illiteracy, and usher in a welfare state so that Sikkim
can enjoy her rightful place under the sun” was deemed
worthy of socialist Scandinavia (Time 1963b). The Queen
in these narrations emerged as an industrious figure –
striving to popularize Sikkim’s handicraft, writing a book
on its history, learning the local language and customs
and touring the farthest reaches of the kingdom with her
husband (Time 1969). Coverage of the coronation ceremony
celebrated the effervescence of “lissome American girls,
friends of the Queen”, dancing with Sikkimese aristocrats
to the tunes of a turbaned local band (Time 1965). It
presented Sikkim as “wistfully pin[ing] for more autonomy
under India”, while adding the cautious note that “it is
India’s army that has thus far kept Peking from making
another Tibet out of Sikkim” (Time 1965).
Differing ideological affiliations lead to differing
interpretations of this period of Sikkim’s history. Some see
it as the over-ambitious, ill-advised, ill-timed venture of
a less-astute statesman. This is accompanied by troubling
misogynistic undertones, with culpability attributed
to the ‘foreign woman’ for leading the King astray (Das
1983).10 Others cast this juncture as the legitimate counterhegemonic nationalistic ambitions of a cultural minority
(Cooke 1980; Datta-Ray 1984; Hiltz 2003). Datta-Ray (1984),
offering a counter-point to Das (1983), painstakingly
depicts the autonomy enjoyed by Sikkim in its dealings
with the British, therefore arguing for the legitimacy of
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the Chos rgyal’s post-colonial ambitions. He also stresses
that the internal unrest since the early 1970s – in terms
of popular protests against the monarchy, especially
by Nepali constituents who felt they were treated as
inferior to the Bhutia-Lepcha subjects, and demands by
the political parties for more power vis-à-vis the palace
– which disrupts the characterization of the actions
and aspirations of the palace as arising out of a unified
nationalistic sentiment, were products of external
instigation. Sikkim the film, as I will show, captures and
thus offers a window into the deep ambivalence that marks
this period.

film Kanchenjungha13 had been shot in Darjeeling. This
film involved Ray’s cousin, who lived in the region and,
acquainted with the royal family, probably served as
a liaison between the two parties (Robinson 2004). His
son documents the difficulties of filming in “places like
Lachen, where it was very difficult to travel at that time,
there was no electricity and [they] would work at night
in candlelight” (Telegraph 2010); the project purportedly
started with his cousin selling it to him as a well-paid
holiday, where he would be making a film with royal
patronage, staying at the palace and travelling throughout
the state (Robinson 2004).

The Commissioning

The Film

It was in the period of heightened ethno-nationalism
following Palden Thondup Namgyal’s ascendency to the
throne that Sikkim the documentary was commissioned.
Satyajit Ray was then a renowned film-maker in postcolonial India. Born of the cine-club movement in Calcutta
which was influenced by various European and Soviet
traditions of realist cinema, Ray’s films sought on one hand
to cultivate a national public with discerning taste in the
aesthetics of visual representation; and on the other to
present Indian cinema to the world as being on par with
the intellectual and technical prowess of this medium
elsewhere (Majumdar 2012; Ray 1976).

In keeping with his vision for documentary film-making,
Ray’s intention through Sikkim was to capture the essence
of the place and its people. Robinson (2004) characterizes
this as a self-effacing, subject-oriented gaze. Even as the
production was hampered by the censorship of its content
by the patrons (which will be discussed in greater detail
below),14 the part he was able to retain was described by
him as “a paean of praise for the place” (275). Thus the film
opens with the encompassing soundscape of ceremonial
trumpets with the visual of white prayerflags. This gives
way to a natural soundscape of chirping birds and gushing
rivers and waterfalls, accompanied by zoomed in and
zoomed out shots of the snow-capped Kangchendzonga,
the cascading rivers and orchids and other flora. Ray
was particularly proud of the poetic effect of “a shot of a
parallel ropeway with two carriages advancing towards
each other…[where] they’re reaching this point [and he]
cuts to a shot of a piece of telegraph wire. It’s raining and
there are two drops of rain approaching on a downward
curve” (Robinson 2004).

Ray’s focus on the aesthetics of cinema made him an ideal
choice for the production of a travel documentary on
Sikkim, at a time when it was trying to overturn the clampdown against tourism imposed by India. Tourism had a
special ideological position for Sikkim (Cooke 1980), which
saw it as a way to bolster its security and integrity and
avoid any misunderstanding of its “basic affiliations” (i.e.
suspicions of being close to China) caused by this forced
isolation (Rose 1969: 38). Ray’s international reputation
was complimentary to the project of increasing Sikkim’s
visibility to the outside world.11 Thus, before the product
had come into being, it had been invested with a set of
ideological meanings with which its physical manifestation
would have to tarry. The tall order was for it to be a
consolidation and carrying forward of the cultural-political
nationalistic effervescence of that period, which had so far
only sporadically translated onto pages of international
magazines.
According to Ray’s son, the queen was an admirer of Ray’s
work and thus recommended him to the king12 (Bhaumik
2010). By this time, Ray had made a significant portion of
his oeuvre including the internationally renowned Apu
trilogy, Nayak, Charulata etc. Closer home to Sikkim, his

On one hand the film, through Ray’s Attenboroughish
modernist narration of natural history, takes us visually
through Sikkim’s wild flora and fauna and then through
its agricultural practices – transitioning from nature to
culture in not so subtle ways. Thus, farmers cultivating
terraced fields in Lachung and Lachen are depicted as
living idyllic lives ensconced within the mountains and
monasteries. Montages of their daily activities are perhaps
meant to invoke a sense of frolicking communion between
humans, animals and nature. The other theme is “the
fascinating mélange of hill-folk that is the Sikkimese
population”, instantiated through a consciously intrusive
gaze15 into the different ethnic groups. The visual markers
of difference are focused on and woven into a narrative of
merger without loss of diverse identities – of dress, dialect,
religions. The locus of this crucible of diversity is the
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Namchi Bazaar and Gangtok’s Lal Bazaar – the latter also
a place for the Indians who have come to live and work in
Sikkim. Depiction of the practice of Mahayana Buddhism
which is the “official religion of Sikkim”, at the Padma yang
rtse (Pemayangtse) monastery, at Rumtek and at the Gtsug
lag Khang (Royal Chapel) are countered with a scene of a
public proselytization drive in Lal bazaar, with Nepalispeaking men bespeaking the virtue of ‘yesu.’
The sound-track of the film, composed by Ray himself,
has received special attention after the film’s rediscovery.
Much of it interestingly uses folk-music which implicitly
invokes the narrated diversity. The opening song invokes
“Denjong” (’Bras mo ljongs), which is a Bhutia way of
describing Sikkim, implying “the fruitful valley” or the
“valley of rice” (Balikci 2008: 6); and “mayel lyang” a
Lepcha phrase meaning ‘an earthly paradise’ (Arora 2009:
63). In taking us through Gangtok, we hear a Nepali song
invoking Kangchendzonga, asking one to dance a maruni
(traditional dance of the Tamang community) and play the
madal (drum).
Ray complained of having to make more than forty
percent of the film into something bureaucratic (Robinson
2004). These bureaucratic themes include the new roads,
which “bring civilization to… border-tribes” that “came
from Tibet” and free education to which “twenty-five
percent of the state budget” is allocated. Advertently or
inadvertently, the film shows the contrast between the
aristocratic Tashi Namgyal Academy, where teachers in
western short skirts conduct morning assemblies and
the rustic schools where children carry a desk each to
start class and girls play basketball on dirt grounds.16 A
picture of the king and queen are also seen hanging on
the walls of one of the schools, reminding the viewer of
the differing logic of nationhood, in case it is forgotten.
The Chos rgyal is introduced as the “righteous king,” in
the twentieth minute of the documentary – sitting in the
veranda of his palace, receiving offerings from his subjects
who prostrate on the ground as a mode of greeting him.17
At this stage, while his father, the late Tashi Namgyal
is named, Palden Thondup remains unnamed. We are
shown pictures of his wedding to Hope Cooke, who is
named and the international attention the event received
is mentioned. The royal couple are depicted making
appearances at ‘fun-fares’ and distributing prizes at local
school events. Another “bureaucratic” agenda presented
is that of handicrafts – with shots of the weaving process,
mainly dominated by girls and the carving process, which
is presented as the forte of boys.
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The crescendo of the documentary is the celebration of
“Kagyed” (bKa’ brgyad) – the closing of the Tibetan year
– with its prayers, ceremonial dances and grand feast.18
The festival is depicted more as a social or cultural fact
and less as a religious fact. Whether this is the effect of
lesser information from his interlocutors about the ritual
significance of the dance and other symbolic acts, or
whether it is Ray’s own modernist sensibilities which leads
to this surface-based depiction, we can only speculate. He
narrates about the ritual significance of the dance “being
lost upon the outsider” but compliments the evocative
quality of the rhythm, of the stately gestures and music,
and, of the majesty of the silk and brocade costumes. The
acharyas, or masked jesters who “provide impromptu
playfulness to the solemnness of the ritual dances” provide
for perhaps one of the most controversial scenes in the
film, wherein they comically prostrate on the ground
multiple times as the king passes by.
The Police Band and Royal Guards make an appearance as
the other embodied articulations of nationhood. The Chos
rgyal, the Rgyal mo (pronounced Gyalmo) and the royal
entourage are depicted as arriving at the palace grounds to
be saluted by the modern state apparatus i.e. the guards,
followed by the more feudal form of tribute from the two
aforementioned acharyas. The scene of the masked dance
is interspersed with men in khaki polishing silverware and
setting the table with drinks for the imminent feast on
one hand and with the arrival of the lay population on the
grounds beyond on the other. The latter evokes the quality
of a village fair. Besides some food and cattle trading,
the camera pans on the many huddles of gambling men
indulging in a “popular pass-time of the hill-folk.” While
the king and queen attend to their royal guests at the
buffet, the commoners are shown sitting on the ground,
being served plain rice, pork and chang. The final ritual
of the burning of the shrine of straws (as a symbol of the
evils to be eliminated) then cuts to a montage of groups of
children bashfully laughing (and some of them smoking)
in front of the camera. The then camera zooms into the
Kangchendzonga and a ‘the end’ sign appears.
The First Rupture
Ernesto Laclau (1989: 90) argues that any structural
system though limited, is always surrounded by an
“excess of meaning” which it is unable to master and
which consequently renders “society as a unitary and
intelligible object which grounds its own partial processes”
an impossibility. Attention to this “precarious character
of any structuration” (92) had led Raymond Willliams

(1977: 106-107) to theorize history as always in the making,
instead of treating it as epochs with already known
structures and products. Bakhtin (1981: 419-420) uses
the term heteroglossia to depict this dialogic character
of discourse as the mover of history. Thus represented
narratives might be ironically reappropriated such that
in retaining a pseudo-objective character of facts, the
subsequent authors can add opposing meaning and
value. However, such reaccentuations elide a complete
solidarity between the author and her discourse, and
exist somewhere between complete reification and
transparent intentionality (Bakhtin 1981). In locating the
source of excess, Williams (1977: 122-123) distinguishes
between “residual meanings,” which serve as potential
sources of future threats, subject to “reinterpretation,
dilution, projection” and separates them from the
“emergent,” which are new meanings and values which
may be incomplete, uneven or non-articulated, but are
oppositional and alternative to the dominant culture.
Thus in tracing the signification of Sikkim, we need to
see each subsequent claim over it not as an addendum
to a positive reality but in each instance as a making of
meaning and value. Discourse in being dialogic enters the
terrain of the other, anticipates and incorporates it and
in the process changes its subsequent utterance (Bakhtin
1981). Ray’s claim about the interference in production in
terms of a preponderance of statistical information and a
disproportionate emphasis on sections of the population
the royalty wanted to focus on (Robinson 2004) attests
to this dynamic. Dialogicality characterized Sikkim even
before it claimed its place as a fully articulated cultural
product in the public domain. At stake were the competing
representations of Sikkim tied to differing visions of
its past, present and future and the role of cinema in
mediating this trajectory. Insofar as ideology operates
through the insistence on “closure, fixation of meaning
and non-recognition of the infinite play of differences”
(Laclau 1989: 92), the disagreements between Ray and the
royal patrons over the content of the film were rooted
in their ideological stakes in telling and through telling,
shaping the history of Sikkim.
The rupture in the creation of Sikkim has to be understood
in the context of other media representations of the
royal feasts and celebrations as had appeared in the
international print media. These provided the residual
meanings which were sought to be projected onto the
current production by its patrons. One only needs to
contrast the ingratiating prose in the international
journals depicting the marriage ceremony where “the
country people were streaming along…the gaily decorated

capital…with their bundles and babies, their prayer wheels
and rosaries…to witness the most popular of all fairy-tale
plots” (Ross 1963), to Ray’s matter-of-fact depiction of the
arrival of the country-folk to the royal grounds to gamble
and eat plain rice and pork, served on the ground while
the royalty entertained their aristocratic guests separately,
to understand why the latter representation would be
contested by its patrons. Hope Cooke’s exclamation of
“It’s wicked!” at some unflattering shot of a bureaucrat
“eating noodles” (Robinson 2004: 275) is similarly dealing
with the residual representation of eastern bureaucrats
asking the fair ladies to dance, with its connotation of a
self-assured east meeting a ready-to-be-charmed west. It
is the signification of the cultural-political fact of a feudal
monarchy forming the non-bounded register which is
sought to be tamed, in the contestations between the
Sikkimese monarchy which wanted the film to depict
its legitimacy and the modernist Indian filmmaker who
chose to highlight the quaintness of this cultural-political
scenario.
The basis of the rupture here is that for Sikkim any
ideological expression of nation-statehood cannot be
divorced from a depiction of its royalty, whose legitimacy
is rooted not only in tradition but also in the notion of a
divine will which the ruler embodies. Mullard (2011: 26)
highlights the concept of “cakravātin, who on account of
his enlightened status is the ideal ruler, as he will govern
according to higher principles than that of a worldly
political figure” to explain the notion of divine kingship
in Tibetan political theology. However, such kingship he
states “was contractual (between the king and ministers)
and was not a prize sought but a burden shouldered
at the request of others in order to benefit benighted,
rudderless subjects” (Mullard 2011). Cooke (1980: 124)
also stresses the ego annihilating character of the king’s
complete identification with the state which, she argues,
in keeping with Buddhist cosmology differs from the
western sense of the term “L’etat c’est moi.” Thus it seems a
bit inadequate that to summarize the Chos rgyal’s political
ambitions Hiltz (2003) invokes Benedict Anderson’s (1983)
characterization of the last-wave of nationalism. The
friction here is that Anderson’s thesis about nationalism
is one where the public sphere becomes coterminous with
a national consciousness seeped in notions of secularism
and enlightenment rationality that replaces religious
modes of relating to authority. The latter modes of relating
to political authority can in Anderson’s story only find
refracted symbolic depictions in national public spheres.19
Sikkim then can be read in this first moment as an
internally conflicted representation, where even as the
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royal family is intrinsically tied to the unfolding of Sikkim
as a place, appearing in the bazaars, schools and fairs,
there is a refusal to name or personalize the protagonists.
This ambiguity of the film indexes the ambiguity of
Sikkim’s position in the last-wave of nationalism. Thus
inasmuch as the stress is often on the secularization of
cultural symbolic articulations of national belonging
during this period, Sikkim’s inalienable sacral articulation
of nationhood is the excess, the out-of-joints, which then
leads to successive ruptures in the political trajectory
of this place. It is this out-of-joints which India focused
on, to thwart Sikkim’s national ambitions and legitimize
Sikkim’s ultimate merger into the secular Indian federal
union in 197520 (Cooke 1980; Das 1983; Datta-Ray 1984).
One political precursor to this disjuncture is India’s refusal,
post 1947, to officially refer to the King as Chos rgyal, as its
meaning as the “defender of the faith” was not agreeable to
it (Rose 1969: 36). Thus the two particular scenes in the film
which depict elaborate gestures of prostration to the king
– one by a group of men bringing the Chos rgyal offerings of
their first harvest and the other of the acharyas or jesters
during Kagyed – become the site of this protracted historical
tension.
Society is a total fact and parceling it off as cultural or
political has limited analytic or practical benefits in
anthropological reckoning. Robinson (2004) writes of Ray’s
aversion to pushing political propaganda through his films.
This apolitical posture was criticized by his colleagues
and interlocutors of the alternative cinema movement in
India (Majumdar 2012). Especially in the context of Sikkim,
a film commissioned by an overt political entity, this
seemed to be a rather untenable position. On one hand
he is compelled to propagandize on behalf of the state
– narrating its education outlay and eulogizing its road
connectivity. On the other hand, his depiction of certain
characteristics of the state – probably arising out of his
motto of showing things as they were, without projecting
the film-maker’s thoughts onto the material (Robinson
2004: 274) – does leave moments of excess where a political
stance of either being anti-monarchy or a more generic
leftist critic of social inequality may be ascribed to him.
These include the above mentioned scenes of feasting and
gambling by commoners while the aristocracy is waited
upon by men in khaki polishing their silver-ware, or even
subtle shots of the dark village classrooms where children
carry desks on their heads while the elite school enjoys
impeccable infrastructure.
Aesthetic theory argues that the politics of a work of
art works best if separated from the intentionality of
the artist. Whether Ray subscribed to this theory or not
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would require further investigation. What is to be noted
here is that Sikkim did become political. In a collective
viewing of this film during a class on the visual and textual
representations of the Himalayas, one found the audience
perplexed as to what about this very mundane, dated
“National Geographic type” film led it to be banned for
more than thirty years. But perhaps it is this very fact of
its lack of politics that made it so politically volatile. For
example, in depicting the rich-poor inequality without
contextualizing or comparing this scenario to any other, it
becomes open to being conflated with a royalty-commoner
schism. One doubts if a chronicling of any state event
in democratic India circa 1970 would not find a similar
segregation of publics, with similar modes of inclusion
and exclusion. If we take Williams’ and Laclau’s insights
seriously, the meaning of any cultural assertion cannot be
bounded off even as ideological efforts are made to render
meanings static. But since Ray made special efforts to keep
the meaning of the film unbounded, through the move
towards an ostensibly neutral chronicling, it only added
to the intensity of the contest over subsequent ideological
appropriations.
Thus in this first moment of production, the mode of
seeking to bound the meaning of Sikkim took a form
wherein till the state’s merger it was never screened
for anyone besides the royal family. Hence its expected
destiny of “putting Sikkim on the tourism map” (Paul 2010)
had to make way for more contingent manifestations of
history.
The Second Rupture
Articles written in the recent past give a very breezy
account of the years immediately after the film’s making
(Bhaumik 2010; Joshi 2010). It failed to meet it patron’s
expectations, but received an ‘U’ i.e. universal certification
from the Central Board of Film Certification, India in
1973. However as Sikkim was merged into India in 1975,
it was banned by the Indian government, condemning it
to almost thirty years of obscurity (Bhaumik 2010; Joshi
2010). Trying to understand the second rupture in the
after-life of the film by bringing forth all the conditions
which potentially led to its banning exposes the multiple
ideological pulls that were operating on and through this
cultural product. Sikkim is iconic of a very volatile period
of Sikkim’s history, as it transitioned from a monarchy
to being part of a democracy under very complex
conditions. The effort to exercise absolute control over any
interpretation of Sikkim’s signification – by withdrawing it
from circulation – is indicative of the nervousness of the
political apparatus at this moment. Thus at this crucial

juncture of an unboundedness in the unfolding of Sikkim’s
history which was susceptible to various interpretations –
in posterity, as well as in that moment itself – the ban was
an effort to reel in the excess.
As per the Indian official discourse, Sikkim was merged
into the Indian union after a referendum to that effect was
held in April 1975. This followed a few years of popular
uprising. In spite of comprising more than seventy-five
percent of the population, the Nepalis had equal number
of seats in the Sikkim Council as the Bhutia-Lepcha
minority.21 This sense of exclusion from the nationalistic
discourse that centered around the autochthonous
population led them to believe that throwing their lot in
with India and its representative electoral politics would
be more beneficial. The palace and the political parties
had also become increasingly opposed in their stands
(Das 1983; Gupta 1975). Thus B S Das (1983: 13), the Indian
Chief Executive Officer during this period, argues that
the Indian government’s role was mainly to overturn
the administrative breakdown which had followed the
uprising. The agentive actors in his discourse were the
democratically oriented local political parties representing
the Nepali middle-class whom the Chos rgyal had alienated,
with India playing the paternal peace-keeper in their
internal power-struggles.
The specter of communism loomed in the background
(Levi 1959), with India fearing that political unrest
along its frontiers might be exploited by China, with
whom its disputes had already resulted in a war in the
last decade (Rustomji 1987). But a counter point to this
was Sikkim’s monarchy falling short of India’s socialist
agendas in the 70s. Indira Gandhi’s defiant stance towards
the United States of America following the liberation
of Bangladesh through the war with Pakistan made it a
rather inopportune time for its protectorate to be leaning
towards USA and implicitly liberal capitalism22 (Gupta
1975: 797). Even if Sikkim’s ties were largely cultural and
personal,23 in a moment of extraordinary nationalistic
triumphalism from India’s center, these cultural exchanges
became ripe for far-fetched suspicions of espionage and
conspiracy to unsettle India’s strategic interests (Cooke
1980; Das 1983). Further, in terms of strategic alliances,
Sikkim’s proximity to the Calcutta elite was not endearing
to the Delhi government (Gupta 1975: 797). While this
proximity was a result of historical and geographic
conditions (Pradhan 2008; Rustomji 1971), it did little to
allay mutual suspicion with the center or to forge newer
relations more suited to the post-colonial conditions and
the circulation of elites and power-brokers that it entailed.

Of course what the Indian official version does not
state are the legitimate objections Sikkim had about
India’s policy towards it (Cooke 1980), which remained
purposefully vague on the degree of autonomy its treaty
status entailed (Rose 1969: 36). The non-transfer of funds
from excise duties, dominance of Indian bureaucrats in
local administration, and the forced seclusion through
strict control of tourism have been highlighted above.
Further, the role of India in being more than a mere
supporter of calls for democracy, and being instead an
active inciter of communal rifts, has also been chronicled
(Cooke 1980; Datta-Ray 1984; EPW 1979). These writers
argue that agitations against the palace had protestors
being brought in from the neighboring hills outside the
state.
A few years later, EPW (1979: 1737) documents how
the legislative assembly in 1979 “was dissolved on the
speciously ‘democratic’ plea of having outlived its legal
term… [to] pre-empt a reported move by a large group
of MLAs to table a motion in the House to countermand
the merger”. This was the same assembly which had
earlier introduced the merger bill in the legislature
that received a ninety-seven percent support from the
Sikkimese people in the referendum.24 Datta-Ray (1984:
291-294) documents how a similar memorandum, signed
by twenty-nine legislators of the Sikkim Legislative
Assembly, dated March 12, 1975, in the form of a letter to
Mrs. Gandhi, demanded the reverting of home, finance and
establishment portfolios from the Indian Chief Executive
to the Sikkimese Chief Minister, curtailing of the powers of
the Chief Executive and Indian officers on deputation and
called for a dialogue with the Chos rgyal. The memorandum
was later declared illegal and repudiated by the signatories
themselves, under duress from the Indian administrative
representatives.
It is in these moments of acute political volatility and the
resultant need for the national government to achieve
ideological control over cultural dissemination affecting
how these events would be read that Sikkim’s after-life can
be understood. This is the context for the objection that
the Indian government took to a screening of the film in
New York at a festival of Indian films organized by the Asia
Society and the Museum of Modern Art in 1981. This led
to the film being removed from the official list, even as it
was screened (Joshi 2010). At stake was not the content of
the film, but what the idea of a quasi-travel-documentary
commissioned by the royalty stood for or could be
interpreted to stand for.
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Back home, the elements that had been supportive of
Sikkim’s nationalistic leanings, i.e. the intelligentsia
(Hiltz 2003) were still part of Sikkim’s public sphere
after the King’s deposition. As the question of greater
representation of the Sikkimese Nepali population gave
way to new concerns about the central government aiding
greater visibility of the plainsmen who dominated the
business sector in Sikkim (Datta-Ray 1984; EPW 1979),
the residual meaning of nationalism attached to the
royalty became potentially detrimental to the central
governmental interest. The group of MLAs who were to
table the motion to reconsider the merger had come to
power in the elections following the end of the President’s
rule and in the interim the popularity of the party which
had successfully opposed the Chos rgyal during the uprising
had dwindled. Hence India’s interest in deterring Sikkim’s
easy availability is explicable as an unsure political power
being extra-careful about its claims to legitimacy.
However, the clamp-down on Sikkim was linked not only
to a fear of it being a positive representation of Sikkim,
but also to controlling its negative depictions. Ray saw
the ban as a result of fears that a territory of India was
depicted as feudal, indexed by the prostrating subjects.
Since “it show[ed] Sikkim at a certain point in history [and
did not] claim to show Sikkim of today” (Robinson 2004:
276), he considered the ban illogical. Sikkim did hamper
the modernist teleology which India aspired to and which
characterized its self-representation to the outside world.
Hence even as Ray and the royal family could hardly
be said to be ideologically aligned, the nation-state had
stakes in controlling the autonomous production of art
which circulated subversive imageries of place beyond its
control. Here the residual meaning of Sikkim’s suspicious
alliances with the Calcutta elites and of the reception of
Ray’s famed Pather Panchali, which sections of the Indian
government had wanted barred from the Cannes Film
Festival in 1956 for its depiction of poverty in India, added
more connotation to Sikkim’s subversive potential than its
immediate content warranted.25
McGranahan (2005: 576) argues that “by arresting
potentially disruptive histories so that they are
structurally unavailable as history, spaces are secured
for both past and present official truths.” The banning of
Sikkim was thus one such moment of attempted arrest, or
as Laclau (1989: 91-92) writes, an attempt to hegemonize
by seeking to limit the infinite play of social discourse.
The ‘Release’ of Arrested Histories
After the initial period of active censorship, through the
1980s and 1990s the film largely disappeared. It came to
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be said that its prints had gone missing, till stories of its
recovery began to circulate. Thus it is claimed that in
1994 a print deposited by Hope Cooke was found in the
Heffenreffer Museum of Anthropology, Rhode Island.
Meanwhile the print with the royal family in Sikkim was
recovered in 2000 or 2002,26 but believed to be damaged
beyond repair27 (Joshi 2010). Reports claim that finally it
was a print recovered from London which was restored
by the Academy of Motion Pictures (Telegraph 2010), and
further that this print was associated with Sir Richard
Attenborough, to whom the film was a personal favorite
(Banerjee 2010; Bhaumik 2010). This recovery has been
attributed to the efforts of Dilip K. Basu, the founding
director of the Satyajit Ray Film and Study Center at the
University of California at Santa Cruz (Joshi 2010). Joshi
goes on to write that the ban on the film was lifted in 2002
based on the unrestored print from Gangtok, with the
Art and Culture Trust of Sikkim holding the rights to it. It
was the restoration work which took time and the Trust
received a copy of the film on September 11, 2010.
Meanwhile in 2008 the film was screened at the Nantes
Three Continents Film Festival in France, as part of
a Satyajit Ray retrospective. The first Indian public
screening was on November 11, 2010, at a film festival
in Kolkata. This screening became mired in a new set of
controversies and court battles. Finally it was on April 6,
2011 that the documentary was released for continuous
public viewing in a theater in Gangtok (Sikkim NOW! 2011b).
McGranahan (2005: 571), writing about the narratives of
violent Tibetan resistance which were silenced within
the hegemonic production of Tibet’s non-violent national
history, sees the former as “arrested histories… not so
much erased or forgotten as they are postponed and
archived for future use.” History, her interlocutor informs
her, is “truth and fear and some lies” (McGranahan 2005:
570). The period of Sikkim’s history symbolically congealed
in Sikkim can also be read as coming out of a phase of
arrest – a phase where due to the detrimental admixture
of the three above mentioned structures of feelings, “the
time was not right” (McGranahan 2005: 575) for Sikkim’s
collective commemoration (or even denouncement if
such were to be the public verdict). Sikkim’s “arrest” is
also causally related to the materiality of the film itself
which was in this period “lost.” The conditions of this
loss however are linked to the conditions of the arrest
and implications of foul-play form the sub-text of various
write-ups. In McGranahan’s story, the arrest of histories is
emic, whereas for Sikkim the originary external conditions
were complemented and reinforced by local perceptions
and silences.

But what is interesting about the moment of resurfacing of
the arrested history of this particular visual representation
is the multiple narratives of recovery, which index
the continued contestations over sovereignty and the
negotiation of marginality of this erstwhile monarchy
vis-à-vis the larger nation-state. These are historically
rooted contestations which have continued into the
new millennium in an altered form. In the national
media, Sikkim the place falls in the background, and the
protagonist of the story is the maverick film-maker (Indian
Express 2010; Paul 2010; Telegraph 2010). The reference
to the place is mostly in terms of the controversy of
offending the royalty and the cuts in the film Ray had to
make. His son is quoted in each instance, talking about the
difficulties of shooting the film and his father’s aesthetic
vision for representing the beauty of the place (Banerjee
2010; Bhoumik 2010; Chatterji 2012).
A review of the film from its 2010 Kolkata screening
gives it a 4 out of 5 for being a “lesson in film-making,”
with its “balanced colour-pallates” (Paul 2010). As far
as the reviewer is concerned, the purpose of the film is
achieved inasmuch as the beauty of the place is captured
in the depiction of “chirping birds, weavers at work
or the unclear chitchat between denizens.” There is
little perturbation about the fact that in this ostensible
documentary about a place, the place does not talk back
to the film-maker, but is rendered solely by the authorial
narrative of Ray.
A perplexing dichotomy is invoked to characterize these
stylistic choices – that unlike his other documentaries
this film is not about people,28 but a place (Robinson
2004). Yet this is not a nature documentary, which depicts
some pristine nature untouched by civilization – as
troublesomely false the nature-culture divide itself is.
Robinson (2004) stresses Ray’s subject-centric approach
to documentary film-making wherein the directors own
thoughts are not projected onto the film. By this token
then, the subject emergent in Sikkim is not the average
Sikkimese, who surely does not think of everyday
conversation as “unclear chatter,” nor evaluates the
experience of a Cham dance in terms of the elegance
of silk-brocade costumes of the performers alone. The
subject appears to be the outsider as the viewer of this
representation, to whom “the ritual significance is lost,” as
is the content and significance of everyday conversation
and who comes to see the people as the exotic other – the
otherness adding to the aesthetic enjoyment of the place.
Further, some national newspapers characterized the
injunction from the District Court of Gangtok against the

unauthorized public screening of the film in 2010 as a
ban (Banerjee 2010). The article then goes on to describe
how the Government of India is looking for legal and
diplomatic avenues so that the public gets to see the work
of the master (Banerjee 2010, emphasis added). Only some
of these articles clearly state that the injunction was a case
of copyright infringement (Indian Express 2010). Also the
narrative of the recovery of the print implicitly casts the
royal family as careless for possessing a copy of the film
which was “shockingly” damaged beyond repair (Joshi
2010; Telegraph 2010).
The narrative in the local media however is a study in
contrast. Here the release of the film is seen as its “world
premier” (Chhetri 2011), hence asserting sovereign
claims over the film whereby all other screenings so far
are rendered unofficial, lacking legitimacy. While the
glory of the film-maker is acknowledged, the patrons
are symbolically reinstated to an authorial position by
the decision to “release” the film on April 4, the birth
anniversary of the late Chos rgyal, Palden Thondup
Namgyal.29 This is a moment of ironic re-signification
which breaks from the residual ideological meanings
that had congealed around the film previously and
rides on the wave of an emergent space for Sikkim’s
self-articulation as a culturally distinct entity within
the nation-state. If the Chos rgyal’s actions in the 70s
operated via the global moment of decolonization, the
actions now can be understood in the context of global
articulations of indigeneity, which while claiming spaces
for autochthonous assertions, do not threaten the concept
of the nation-state in an immediate way.30
Agentiveness is also recovered for the copyright holder
of the film - the Art and Culture Trust [ACT] of Sikkim
“has worked for many years now to restore the original
prints of this thus far lost work” (Chhetri 2011). Thus
the uniqueness of the Gangtok screening was that it was
to be accompanied by “an audiovisual presentation on
the restoration process prepared by Josef Lidner from
the Academy Motion Picture Arts and Science.” Here the
royal family is not cast as marginal actors in possession of
damaged copies, but rather the story begins with Chos rgyal
Wangchuk Namgyal, the current titular royal descendent,
donating a repository of materials amongst which Sikkim
was discovered. Here it is the “Trust that got in touch with
the Ray Society, through which [it] was able to contact the
archives at the Academy Motion Pictures Arts and Science,
California” (ibid). Dilip Basu in this narrative becomes the
liaison. The event in Calcutta is pitched as “shocking” for
its infringement.
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Thus the screening was an occasion for public
commemoration of “the entire royal family along with
the senior citizens who lived in the period captured in the
documentary” (Chhetri 2011) who were invited as special
guests. It was an opportunity for the re-inscription or restatement of ethnic identity, with dignitaries dressed in
traditional Khos and Choktes, making speeches on stage, to
witness which citizens had weathered hail and rain (Tashi
2011).
Locally it was a safe moment for the release of arrested
royal histories by introducing students to the “dignity
and grace of the Chos rgyal” (Chhetri 2011). Cooke writes
in her personal correspondence (March 5, 2013) how
her daughter witnessed the audience cheering at the
purportedly feudal signifiers, such as the Palace band,
which she thinks Ray depicted with the intention to mock.
The cheering thus turns authorial intentionality on its
head, highlighting the unbounded nature of any cultural
production. Chhetri ends his article with the aspirations
that “the late Chos rgyal’s purpose to showcase Sikkim to
the rest of the world will finally become possible after
forty years and the release of the film will help in creating
more awareness and generate interest and curiosity on
Sikkim.”
The film is reviewed in the regional press along the
register of a harking-back to simpler times, which
depicts the “hard-work,” “dignity” and “innocence” of
the Sikkimese people. If the film failed to contextualize
the obeisance of a group of men to the king on the royal
grounds, the reviewer explains it as “jheshu…offered to
the Gods in Gtsug lag Khang (the royal chapel) by the Chos
rgyal on behalf of the people” (Tashi 2011). Signification
of an ethnically divided populace has been erased in
this reading of the film, which is seen now as capturing
a Sikkimese essence. A different residual aspect slips in
though, in the reviewer’s special mention of the marching
band of the Sikkim Guards and their salute to the king
– read now as a “poignant” but “probably ineffective”
expression of sovereignty31 (Tashi 2011).
Conclusion
Raymond Williams (1977: 129) writes that “perhaps the
dead can be reduced to fixed forms (though their surviving
records are against it). But the living will not be reduced….
all the known complexities, the experienced tensions,
shifts, and uncertainties, the intricate forms of unevenness
and confusion, are against the terms of the reduction”.
Sikkim’s trajectory attests to the unpredictable, unbounded
ways in which hegemonic assertions work, such that issues

52 | HIMALAYA Fall 2013

and contestations are never irretrievably settled. This
insight is perhaps echoed in Tashi’s (2011) locally situated
summary of the Sikkim saga – that it is a “still-surviving
graphic archive of what Sikkim was. I think that is what we
should all celebrate, that it was made, that it survived, that
it saw the light of day.”
In seeing the light of day, Sikkim made way for other
materializations of its arrested history to seek release.
Thus the “restoration and preservation work on some
other films on Sikkim like ‘The Yankee Queen,’ a royal
wedding film, silent films, and footage shot by Chogyal
Palden Thondup Namgyal [were] also in the pipeline”
(Eden 2011). As these historic moments seek reentrenchment in public consciousness, the contemporary
meaning of Sikkim as a place and a socio-cultural
collective and its relation to the larger nation-state are
re-articulated and re-signified, as in the past drawn on for
this re-articulation. The exercise of understanding Sikkim
through Sikkim helps us explore this dynamic process of
the making of history and identity, while attending to the
material/cultural objects which mediate such movements.
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gift of land given by the Chos rgyal was retained under his
sovereignty, with development of such land being taxable
by the monarchy (Mullard 2011: 180-184).
4. Matters spiraled with the arrest of the noted botanist Sir
J. D. Hooker along with Dr. Campbell, the Superintendent of
Darjeeling, for trespassing on Sikkim and Tibet’s sovereign
territories during a scientific expedition of the Himalayas in
1849. The British also accused Sikkim of the “kidnapping of
British subjects” from Darjeeling for “slave-trade between
Sikhim and Bhutan” (Risley 1989 [1894]: 245).
5. In 1887, the empire launched a military offensive against
Tibet for encroaching on Sikkimese territory at Lingtu. This
alleged encroachment was Tibet’s way of expressing strong
opposition to aggressive overtures of trade being made by
the British. The incumbent Sikkimese monarch, in refusing
to respond to British summons to explain his position, was
seen as submitting to the authority of Tibet and China in
this matter (Datta-Ray 1984: 27-31; Risley 1989 [1894]:
vi-xiv).
6. That occurred during the mid-twentieth century, in a
phase of global decolonization (Anderson 1983, cited by
Hiltz 2003: 71).

Endnotes
1. Hereon, for brevity, Sikkim refers to the state and Sikkim
refers to the documentary.
2. The Gazetteer claims that on account of the Treaty of
Titalia, signed in 1817 after the British defeated Nepal,
territory which has been previously annexed from Sikkim
by Nepal was returned to Sikkim (Risley 1989 [1894]).
Recent studies have sought to question this imperial bias.
Consulting Sikkim’s Palace documents, scholars assert that
during the Sino-Nepalese War of 1788-1792, siding with
the Chinese forces, Sikkim had itself won back some of
its territory which the Gorkha expansionist powers had
laid claims to (Dorjee 2011: 67; Mullard 2011: 175-179).
However the subsequent treaty between China and Nepal
failed to take cognizance of these military feats, causing
Sikkim to actively aid the British in their operations against
the Gorkha army and thus rightfully benefit from the Titalia
treaty (Dorjee 2011: 67; Mullard 2011: 175-179).
3. Darjeeling was sought by the British (for a royalty of
6000 Rupees per annum) on account of its temperate
climate which made it an ideal sanatorium (Rock 1953).
Again imperial sources present this as a peaceful process
of just compensation for quelling “certain Lepcha
malcontents” (Risley (1894) 1989: iix). However, Mullard
(2011: 180-184) highlights the spurious help provided by
the British during the Ko Ta Pa rebellion and the displeasure
of Sikkim at the British for treating Darjeeling as its
sovereign territory. In Sikkim’s political understanding, a

7. Sangey Deki, who was of Tibetan descent as per the
marriage customs of the monarchy.
8. I am grateful to the reviewer for pointing this out.
9. Time Magazine (1963a) was more circumspect,
reminding the reader of the precedence of the Hollywood
actress Grace Kelly, who married the Prince of Monaco.
10. B. S. Das was the Chief Executive Officer (Dewan)
deputed by India in 1973, preceding the merger when
political unrest had heightened. His views in the book,
though personal, may be closer to the general Indian
perceptions, especially among Indian officials. However, in
a personal letter J. S. Lall wrote to Nari Rustomji (both had
served as Dewans of Sikkim before Das) – “poor Thondup is
painted as the villain of the piece, as if our own people had
nothing to do with turning his head” (N. K. Rustomji Papers
n.d).
11. Hope Cooke writes in her memoirs (1980, quoted in
Hiltz 2003: 81) “We wanted people to have Sikkim in their
[i.e. international] consciousness. If...something happened,
we wouldn’t be quite so alone. We knew that they wouldn’t
be able or willing to help, but somehow the mere fact of
people knowing of us seemed to diffuse the awfulness of
a potential take-over [by India] and possibly ... keep it in
abeyance.”
12. Hope Cooke, in her personal correspondence with
the author (March 5, 2013), offers a different account. She
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states that it was Ray who was interested in making a film
on Sikkim and that his wife had contacted the palace.

of this secularization has long been questioned. See Asad
(1993, 1999) for example.

13. Interestingly or ironically, when like his other films
Kanchenjungha was criticized by Ashok Rudra for its lack of
interest in directly addressing social problems as was being
done by his leftist contemporaries, Ray invoked the fairytale like quality of the mountains to defend his restrained
modernist tenor (Majumdar 2012: 762). Hope Cooke in her
personal correspondence (March 5, 2013) makes a similar
criticism of the film for failing to incorporate the local
population into the story, referred to it as “retro-Raj.”

21. By 1974 Sikkim had a bicameral dyarchy with eighteen
elected members, seven each from the Nepalese and
Bhutiya-Lepcha communities, one each for the Tsongs and
Nepalese Hindu scheduled castes, a representative of the
kingdom’s 54 Buddhist monasteries, and one from a general
seat who was elected by the entire populace on a simple
majority [with] the durbar nominat[ing] six councilors”
(Datta-Ray 1984: 101).

14. Hope Cooke (personal correspondence, March 5,
2013) denies this charge. She claims her only input in the
film was to suggest that the crew shoot beyond Gangtok –
something they had not done initially, ostensibly owing to
Ray having a bad knee and a heart condition.
15. Ray was skeptical of the cinema verité movement,
believing that no one could be natural in front of a camera
(Robinson 2004).
16. Cooke (1980: 183) in her autobiography (written much
after the film and Sikkim’s merger) herself derides the “coat
and tie education” of the Academy, preferring the village
school which stands for a Sikkimese ethos, where she sends
her son too. Whether the film was echoing her sentiment
requires further investigation.
17. Datta-Ray (1984: xiv) notes that the traditional mode
of showing submission to the king’s sovereignty involves
the subjects measuring the ground three times with their
bodies, with knees, palms and forehead flat on the ground.
The abbreviated form of this homage is one of bowing from
the waist, with fingertips touching the ground three times.
18. Balikci (2008: 314-315) explains, “during the time of
the kingdom, the Kagyed cham (bKa’ brgyad ’cham) used
to be held at the Palace chapel during the last days of the
year by the lamas of Pemayangtse monastery. [V]illagers….
would send an offering of newly harvested grain to the
Palace which helped to feed the participating lamas.” This
was part of the “the end of year ritual, the loshi gurim (lo
gcig sku rim—‘ninth ritual of the end of the year’)…[where]
lamas read the ritual text offering to Mahākāla (mGon
po’i bskang gso) ten times over the ten-day period….and
perform[ed] its cham on the last two days” (ibid).
19. For example, for him the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
is one such monument, which confers on martyrdom for
the nation a greater affective intensity on a metaphysical
register than a utilitarian view of state-subject relations
would allow for.
20. The stress here is on the deployment of a narrative of
secularization in liberal politics. The veracity and extent
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22. India’s involvement in the Bangladesh crisis of 1971
had been narrativized as India’s inevitable moral and
pragmatic response to the crises of millions of refugees
spilling over into its borders. Perhaps this preexistent
narrative structure, fresh in public memory, made it easier
to cast Sikkim as a similar story. Cooke (1980: 245-247)
documents such a report in Newsweek, damning the
monarchy for creating “refugees from paradise.”
23. Hope Cooke worked to organize fashion events
showcasing Sikkimese ethnic clothing in “upscale
department stores, exclusive clubs, and museums in New
York City and Washington, D.C” (Hiltz 2003: 81). Also Cooke
(1980: 166) writes how her success in getting the Asia
House in New York to establish a Sikkim Council drew the
ire of the Indian Foreign Office.
24. The veracity of this referendum and its inflated figure
have been questioned by Datta-Ray (1984) and Cooke
(1980) among others. Datta-Ray (1984: 259) especially
relies on an unpublished document by Nar Bahadur
Khatiawara (who had been at the forefront of the antipalace agitations) and nine others, titled “Sikkim’s Merger-A
Brief Resume” to make his point.
25. This ideological contest over the depiction of poverty
in India for foreign publics is a question far from settled. It
is reopened with every other film of the realist genre made
in India and shown globally. For Ray this issue resulted
in his historic quibbles with the Hindi film actress Nargis,
who went on to be a Member of Parliament and one of his
staunchest opponents (http://satyajitray.ucsc.edu/critics.
html).
26. The same article seems to offer two dates.
27. Hope Cooke (personal correspondence March 5, 2013)
states that since the film was owned by Sikkim (paid for
partly by the then Government and partly by the Chos
rgyal himself), the dissemination of the film was not within
her rights. She had possession of a copy for a brief period
after Chos rgyal’s death, when legalities were being figured
out. She writes thus that “my stepson Wangchuk was Chos
rgyal‘s heir and it was he - appropriately - who allowed the
film to be copied and shown via his Cultural Trust.”

28. Ray’s other documentaries were largely biographical,
like Inner Eye about the blinded painter Binode Bihari
Mukherjee and the 1961 documentary on Tagore.
29. The screening though was ultimately postponed, due
to a two-day bandh in the state (Sikkim NOW 2011a).
30. For an excellent discussion on the new modes in which
a distinct Sikkimese identity is articulated by ritualizing
a consolidated ethnicity of Sikkim, as a nation within the
Indian nation, see Vandenhelsken (2011). She also invokes
A C Sinha’s (2006) discussion of the ‘politics of tribalization’
to highlight how Sikkim as a state positions itself as distinct
but not opposed to the Indian state to claim certain
development benefits.
31. Even after agreements had been signed in 1973 with
India and the Sikkimese political parties, which substantially
curbed the authority of the monarchy, the Sikkim Guards
had remained under the direct control of the Chos rgyal
(Datta-Ray 1984: 7). Hence it almost stood as the last
vestige of the legitimacy of Sikkim’s royal polity. Expectedly
then, the attack on and overpowering of the palace guards
by the Indian military on April 9, 1975 is chosen by DattaRay as the moment to depict the end of the monarchy, as
opposed to other moments such as the legislative measures
passed in the Indian parliament to that effect.
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